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and Substance in Law
PHILIP SOPER
Abstract. In this paper the author deals with some theoretical aspects of Robert
Summers’ last book (Summers 2006). In particular, he concentrates on the hazy
relationship between form and substance in Summers’ theory. In order to analyze
some major difficulties entailed in the thesis that form and substance are different
and independent things, the author discusses three specific questions: (1) the
difference between form and substance; (2) the possibility of a form meant to be
value-neutral; (3) how to distinguish a form-centered approach from a formalistic
approach when one has to interpret a statute. This last question is dealt with
through examples taken from two legal decisions.*
I. Introduction
It is a pleasure to participate in this celebration of Summers’ latest
contribution to jurisprudence in his book on Form and Function in a Legal
System (Summers 2006). No-one in the history of jurisprudence comes close
to matching Summers’ efforts over the last half-century to draw attention
to the role that form plays in enabling legal phenomena to achieve their
purposes. And this book, which caps his contributions in this area of
jurisprudence, is not likely to see its equal in any of our lifetimes. But
before I turn to the book itself, I want to mention an earlier book by
Summers, one that I find particular pleasure in reading and re-reading and
have often used in my own courses and work on jurisprudence. I am
referring to Summers’ analytical biography of Lon L. Fuller—one of the
series of profiles on famous legal theorists published nearly 25 years ago
by Stanford University Press (Summers 1984). Lon Fuller, of course, was a
giant in jurisprudence in the generation that preceded both Summers and
myself. In fact, we were both students of Fuller at different times at
Harvard law school. Fuller’s book, which bears some similarities to themes
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in Summers’ book, became the subject of a number of critical reviews.
Summers, in recounting this history, tells the story of Fuller’s response
when he saw these reviews. “They have attacked my book,” Fuller said,
“and it shall not go unnoticed,” whereupon he turned and strode fiercely
up the steps of Langdell Hall (ibid., 12). I mention this incident because I
hope that Summers, who I am sure is equally capable of fiercely defending
any attack on his book, will not view my brief comments today as an
attack. Unlike Marc Antony, who said he came to bury Caesar when in fact
he came to praise him, I come honestly to praise, not to bury or attack.
But praise, like legal phenomena, comes in many forms. One mark of a
successful contribution to academic thought is the extent to which it
provokes questions as well as provides answers. I shall take my cue from
this thought and concentrate on questions that are provoked by Summers’
book, in particular questions about the relation between form and sub-
stance in law.1 Summers suggests that these are different things and that
they are independent: “That it is usually possible to differentiate relatively
sharply between the overall form of a functional legal unit and its material
or other components” (Summers 2006, 61). At the same time, however, he
mentions that form usually has “complementary” content, and that form
leaves its “imprints” or “effects” on content (see, e.g., ibid., 58 inter alia).
Sometimes, he adds, there may be “synergistic” effects between form and
substance (ibid., 386–7). All of these descriptions of the relation between
form and substance are, at best, quite vague and leave many questions for
readers who are trying to evaluate the basic overall thesis that form
deserves more credit for ends achieved through law. This thesis about the
importance of form—that it is “superior” (ibid., 74) and “primary” to other
approaches, which by comparison are “ancillary and supplemental” (ibid.,
77) is the major thesis of the book.2 But any attempt to evaluate this thesis
1 I am aware that Summers eschews using the more common term “substance” as the term
to contrast with “formal”: Summers 2006, 61–3; but it is not clear to me that there is any real
difference in the various terms used to designate the “non-formal.” “Material,” or “compli-
mentary material and other components,” or “content,” or “policy,” or “substance,” all seem
equally apt ways of attempting to name the contrast to the “formal.” Moreover, Summers
himself seems unable to avoid using the more common term on occasion to distinguish the
formal from the non-formal. Thus he describes “form-skeptics” as those who believe that form
can be reduced to “policy” or other “substantive” content (ibid., 179, 238). And he sometimes
contrasts the “formalistic” with the “substantivistic” (ibid., 29, n. 91). The desire to avoid the
more common term may arise in part from a concern to avoid conveying meanings one does
not intend; but that advantage comes at the cost of confusion when new terminology
competes with the more familiar to describe what appears to be roughly the same
phenomenon.
2 Summers extolls the virtues of a form-oriented approach in contrast to two main alterna-
tives. The first alternative is a rule-oriented approach. The second alternative (exemplified by
“form-skeptics”) focuses primarily on substance or policy in a way that fails to accord
sufficient credit to form. Summers is explicit in insisting that a form-oriented approach is
“generally superior” to the first alternative (ibid., 74, 77), and he argues at length, against the
form-skeptic, that form, in contrast to substance or policy, plays more than a merely minor
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leads immediately to two major questions: 1) Exactly what is the difference
between form and substance? and 2) How do these two things interrelate?
The latter question leads to several subsidiary questions: a) Is it possible
that form always follows substance, so that credit is really due mainly to
substance? b) Is it possible that form itself often has a substantive content
and for that reason is important? c) Is it possible that form is being elevated
over substance for the wrong reasons—reasons that explain why the
accusation that one is putting “form over substance” is generally regarded
as pejorative? In what follows, I briefly consider these questions and
indicate how they are provoked by the arguments Summers makes for the
credit due to form.
II. The Distinction between Form and Substance
A. Does Form Follow Substance?
The distinction between form and substance traces at least to Aristotle who
used the term to draw attention to the purposive arrangement of human
artifacts in explaining their causal origins. Summers acknowledges the
“technical philosophical” meaning to be found in Aristotle’s discussion
(ibid., 47), but seems to prefer as a better explanation what he calls “the
most common use of the word in English” in which “‘form’ means the
visible contours or shape of a physical thing.” (ibid., 50). Consider, e.g., a
vase made of clay. Aristotle would have explained that to fully understand
the origins of this object, one needs to distinguish, not only the material
cause (the clay), but also the formal cause (the shape, purposely designed
to hold water and/or flowers). This analogy to physical shape as form
nicely fits Summers’ suggestion that form and substance are independent
concepts that can be sharply differentiated. One can change the shape of
the vase, while leaving the substance unaltered. Or, one can hold the shape
constant and change the substance—the vase can be made of glass or wood
or metal. And in both cases the overall purpose (constructing a container
that will hold water and/or flowers) becomes the measure of success: Poor
form will yield a poor vase, as will an ill-considered substance (a vase
made of porous material?).
Compare, now, this commonsense idea of the distinction between form
and substance with legal phenomena. Consider, in particular, the example
that seems to figure more often than any other in Summers’ analysis: that
of the legal precept that can have varying degrees of definiteness. Shall we
set the speed limit (or the retirement age) at 65, or shall we set it at “a
role (ibid., 238–40). Thus form is defended, either explicitly or implicitly, as playing a more
important role—at least more important than is currently recognized—than either rules or
substance.
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reasonable speed” (or age)? Here the form is one of definiteness and the
substance is the designated speed limit. Now it is clear that we can keep
the form of definiteness constant, while altering the content (changing the
speed limit to 55 or 70, as Summers is quick to point out: ibid. 30, n. 95).
But note that, unlike the vase, we cannot easily do the opposite: We cannot
keep the substantive content (65 mph) the same, while changing the form
of definiteness. In the case of the vase, we can see both form and substance
as independent, keeping the shape the same while changing the content
from clay to glass or vice versa. But in the case of the legal precept, the
substantive policy decision—65 mph should be the maximum speed—
automatically carries with it the correlative form. Substance, it seems,
carries form in its wake.3
B. The Puzzle of Form
Whether the above suggestion applies to other examples of legal phenom-
ena that Summers discusses is an interesting question, which I shall defer
for the moment in order to show how this possibility—that form follows
substance—helps explain one of the major puzzles about form that
Summers considers at the beginning of his book. The puzzle is this: If form
is so important, why has it been neglected and overlooked so long? To put
the question another way, how is it possible that we have managed by and
large to get along relatively well in the design of legal phenomena without
paying explicit attention to form? Summers considers both of these ques-
tions early in the book and offers two sorts of answers.
First, Summers lists several reasons that purportedly explain why form
has been neglected. Scholars, e.g., 1) have failed to provide an overall
definition of form; or 2) have failed to differentiate form from substance;
or 3) have taken form for granted (ibid., 11). But these reasons do not
seem to be explanations for the neglect, so much as repetitions of the
claim that there has been neglect. Explanations must do more than repeat
what it is that is to be explained. So we don’t know why form has been
neglected; we only know that it has been. A second confrontation with
this puzzle occurs a few pages later when Summers asks how it is
possible to have developed generally well-designed legal phenomena
while neglecting the role of form. Now the answer is mainly two-fold: 1)
Western systems have developed over a long period of time and have
managed, incrementally, to achieve relative success in the design of legal
3 Note that it is Summers himself who suggests that the “policy content” or substance of the
speed limit example is the stated rate of speed (ibid., 30). If, on the other hand, one designates
as “substance” the more general policy of determining a safe speed, it may be that one can
avoid the particular criticism just made—that substance often dictates form—but only by
implying that the distinction between form and substance can be manipulated as needed in
order to force the distinction one wants to make.
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phenomena despite the lack of explicit attention to form; and 2) legal
practitioners—judges, lawyers, legislators—may have unconsciously been
using form in practice all along, even though the study of form by
scholars has been neglected. Notice what these explanations suggest:
1) The fact that we are unconsciously using form in practice supports
the possibility that, for the most part, form follows substance. We concen-
trate on the speed limit, or the substantive policy that we want a particular
legal phenomenon to serve, and form follows almost automatically.
2) Second, this view of the relationship between form and substance
helps explain why it is that many of the claims about form are “obvious.”
Summers devotes some time in the early part of the book defending his
claims about the importance of form against the charge that the claims
are obvious (ibid., 15–6). In the end he does not seem to deny that the
importance ascribed to form is often obvious; rather, he defends the
possibility that even the obvious may have hidden dimensions that deserve
fuller exploration. If the role of form is “obvious,” if it is unconsciously
incorporated in practice, perhaps the reason is that form, though present
and distinguishable from content, is secondary, not primary.
III. Form as Substance
I turn now to the possibility that form itself may embrace or entail
substantive elements of value. Three questions present themselves here: 1)
Is the definition of form meant to be value-neutral (a factual concept), or
does it implicitly include moral criteria in deciding what counts as “form?”
2) What substantive consequences does form itself entail—consequences
that need to be taken into account in order to know whether form is
well-designed? 3) Finally, what is the connection between form and the
substantive ends that form helps to achieve?
A. Is “Form” a Value-Neutral Concept?
Summers repeatedly suggests that form can be both good or bad, well- or
ill-designed for the purposes it is intended to achieve. This suggests that
“form” is intended to be a factual (neutral) concept, not a moral concept.
But doubts about whether this is in fact his intention are raised at the very
outset. “Form” is defined as the “(i) purposive, (ii) systematic, (iii) arrange-
ment” of legal phenomena. But why do we need all three of these ideas?
The first (purposive) and third (arrangement) are easy to understand.
Consider again the example of the vase. Beginning with the material
element (clay, glass, or metal), one understands that the “arrangement” of
this material is a way of drawing attention to its shape or form. So, too, in
order to distinguish random accidental arrangements from the intentional
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arrangements characteristic of human-designed artifacts, we need to add
that the arrangement is “purposive”: The arrangement is purposely
designed to achieve certain ends—the clay is shaped in order to hold water
and/or flowers. But what does “systematic” add to these two ideas? What
would it mean to purposely arrange clay material in the shape of a vase
but in an unsystematic way? Isn’t that just another way of suggesting that
the form is ill-designed, sloppy, not well-suited to the end? If so, then
“systematic” is serving indirectly as a value element that incorporates
notions of good design into the very definition of form. The clean division
between the idea of form, which can be either good or bad, is muddied by
refusing to count as “form” those arrangements that are insufficiently
“systematic.” Summers reinforces this conclusion in his own explanation
for why “systematic” is necessary to the definition. He explains that
“systematic” refers to the relationship among parts of an arrangement and
denotes a requirement of “consistency” among the parts (ibid., 42). The
example he gives is of a legislature that is too large and unwieldy to
operate efficiently. But “too large” and “unwieldy” are evaluative terms. To
purposively arrange a legislative body in a way that is too large still results
in a functional legal unit—just one that isn’t very well-designed. If we
don’t count such a unit as having a “form” just because it is unwieldy, we
seem to have collapsed the distinction between form simpliciter and good
form.
Why is this important? Two consequences follow from making form an
evaluative rather than simply a factual concept. First, the credit due to
form is lessened to the degree that we have already qualified the defi-
nition with a substantive criterion—it is substance, once again, not form
alone, that deserves part of the credit for ends achieved. Second, and
perhaps more seriously, the inclusion of evaluative criteria into the defi-
nition of form can lead to misleading characterizations of legal phenom-
ena. Consider, e.g., the form of a court. Though Summers does not
subject this institution to the same form-oriented analysis as other func-
tional legal units, he does suggest that an essential formal feature of a
court, in contrast to a legislature, is the court’s “dialogic” procedure
(ibid., 56). In order to make relevant factual findings and apply the law,
the court, unlike a legislature, must give both sides an opportunity to be
heard. But surely we cannot refuse to count an institution as a court if,
instead of proceeding “dialogically,” it proceeds to inquire and investigate
on its own, without input from the parties. The adversary system is not
the only form of a court in Western societies, as the dominance of
inquisitorial systems in civil law countries makes clear. Here, then, is a
possible example of how a preference for a particular type of court (the
adversarial) can be incorporated as a value judgment into the very defi-
nition of form, leading to a misidentification of the formal features of a
court in general.
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B. The Substantive Consequences of Form
Whether a particular form is well- or ill-designed is determined by how
well it serves the purposes of the particular legal phenomena that it
embraces. For the most part, Summers provides an illuminating account of
the difference that form can make in achieving such purposes. I raise here
only one possible critique concerning the consequences of particular forms
that may have been overlooked. Consider, again, the repeated example of
the difference that the form of definiteness makes in choosing between a
specific rule (e.g., 65 mph speed limit) as opposed to a more general
principle (drive at a reasonable speed). Summers provides an elaborate
analysis of the factors that might determine whether to choose the more
definite speed limit as opposed to a more general discretionary standard of
“reasonable speed” (ibid., 190–9). But the policy considerations that figure
in the analysis focus exclusively on the obvious factors of “safety, timeli-
ness of flow, and driver choice.” Missing in the analysis is the major
critique of the critical legal studies movement that suggests that definite-
ness in legal precepts favors the sophisticated and well-to-do over the less
well-educated and vulnerable classes of society (Kennedy 1976). Adding
this consideration into the analysis could reveal the potential of particular
forms to generate substantive effects, both positive and negative, on their
own accord—competing with the policy objectives that underlie the legal
norms.
C. Form’s Influence on Substance
One final question about the substantive implications of form is raised by
Summers’ repeated suggestion that good form can beget good content or
substance. For example, “definiteness and clarity of expression in a draft
rule facilitate scrutiny and may lead to improvements in content”
(Summers 2006, 204). Now this question of the connection between form or
procedural principles, on the one hand, and substantive content, on the
other, has a long history. It became in many ways the most contested issue
raised by Fuller’s book, previously mentioned, which similarly claimed
that adherence to certain procedural values requiring clarity in the law
would establish minimal moral values in law. H. L. A. Hart, almost
uncharacteristically caustic, attacked Fuller’s claim, which was similar to
the one Summers makes: “There is [. . .] no special incompatibility between
clear laws and evil. Clear laws are [. . .] ethically neutral though they are
not equally compatible with vague and well-defined aims” (Hart 1965,
1287). Where does Summers stand in this argument about the connection
between clarity in form and goodness of content? On the one hand,
Summers is careful to qualify his claim by suggesting only that good form
“tends” to beget good content (Summer 2006, 204). And he is quick to point
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out that well-designed form may be combined with bad policy or other
content, citing the example of our own pre-Civil War American Fugitive
Slave Act (ibid., 205). On the other hand, when Summers returns to the
connection between form and substance in a later chapter on the rule of
law, the qualifications appear to have been dropped. Adherence to the
principles of the rule of law is claimed to realize a wide variety of
substantive values, including those of “legitimacy, justice, freedom, dignity,
democracy, and rationality” (ibid., 341). It would advance our understand-
ing of how Summers understands the connection between good form and
good content if we knew the strength of the claim, as well as the
assumptions about human nature on which it is based. We still have in the
modern world, long after the end of our own examples from the period of
slavery, many examples of regimes that have clear laws that are well-
designed to communicate legal norms the content of which, however,
seems woefully lacking in respect for human freedom and dignity.
IV. Form and Formalism
I turn now to one final question about form. Summers carefully distin-
guishes “form” in his sense from the “formalism” that has been the subject
of so much attack as a method of judicial interpretation. “Formalistic
interpretation,” in the sense of “wooden literalism,” is a vice that Summers
condemns as well as others; and, he insists, nothing in his own emphasis
on the importance of form leads to, or encourages such, literalist
approaches to interpretation. Summers provides an illuminating example
of this vice in a case posed by Cicero. In that case, a court had to interpret
a marine salvage statute that awarded any ship in distress that had been
abandoned by its owners to any sailor who “stayed with the ship.” In the
case before the court, the sailor had been sick and thus unable to escape the
floundering ship. After the ship luckily made it to safe shores, the sailor,
who had done nothing to insure the ship’s safety, claimed the ship under
the statute and the Court awarded it to him. Summers rightfully criticizes
this case as an example of “wooden literalism.” Surely it makes most sense
to interpret the salvage statute as awarding the ship to those who “stay
with the ship in order to save it” (ibid., 276–8).
The problem with this explanation of the vice of formalism is that it
stands in rather marked contrast to other features of the book that seem to
emphasize the importance of language in interpretation. In his survey of
interpretative methodologies, for example, Summers argues for the priority
of a “language-oriented criterion as the primary criterion of interpretive
faithfulness” (ibid., 257). This focus on language is preferred to one that
takes context and purpose into account, or one that looks for legislative
intent. Similarly, we have already seen how often Summers favors defi-
niteness and clarity as a form for precepts, even claiming that such form
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begets good content. Finally, on at least two occasions, Summers hints that
judicial decisions such as Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (as well
as several other cases) are wrongly decided because they are inconsistent
with the clear language of the statutes being interpreted (ibid., 24, n. 50,
and 29, n. 91). Now Welsh was a case that held that a personal moral code
qualified one for conscientious objector status under a statute whose
“literal language” required a religious basis for the belief. If this decision
is wrongly decided simply because it is inconsistent with the “literal
language,” how do we distinguish this case from Cicero’s? In Cicero’s case,
we look sensitively to context and purpose and decide that “stayed with
the ship,” should be supplemented by reading into the statute “if done in
order to save it.” How can we criticize Welsh, on the basis of the language
alone, without also considering context and purpose? Particularly given
how difficult it is to define “religion,” what better guide is there here to the
legislative will than context and purpose—including the possibility that
any other construction of the statute would lead to serious constitutional
problems (as Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion confirmed)? Indeed, the
majority’s opinion can be read as interpreting the “religion” criterion for
qualification to mean “only if no serious constitutional establishment
clause issue is thus presented,” just as we read the salvage statute to mean
the sailor wins only if he stayed “in order to save the ship.”4
Two general questions emerge. First, how does one distinguish
Summers’ preference for language-oriented approaches from the vice of
“formalism” that he purports to abhor? If formalism as an interpretive
methodology is bad because it is insufficiently sensitive to purpose and
context, doesn’t that mean that the methodological priorities for interpre-
tation should be awarded to purpose, context, and intent, as well as
language (or even that priority should be given to the former)? Second, is
there after all something about the emphasis on form that leads to this
preference for a language-based orientation? Though Summers denies that
there is any such implication, it is curious to find that both “formalism”
and “form” share a similar basis in making language, rather than purpose
or context, the primary guide to interpretation.
4 Even more striking is another case Summers faults for failing to heed the “clear language”
of the statute. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Ca., 1972), the court
decided that “projects” requiring impact statements included governmental decisions to issue
permits for private developments. The majority insisted that “the mere literal construction of
a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature
apparent by the statute”: ibid., 1057. It is hard to see how Summers can oppose formalism and
yet fault this opinion on the basis of language alone without considering the court’s argument
about purpose and intent in construing the language.
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